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Introduction
In recent years, a small but steadily growing third-party movie
editing service industry has taken root and grown in response to
distinct viewer demand for so-called "E-Rated"'-edited for
content-versions of motion pictures on DVD and videotape.2
However, the third-party editing companies comprising this small
industry do not own the copyrights for any of the films that they
(directly or indirectly) copy, alter, and distribute, nor have they been
authorized by the copyright holders to engage in these activities.3 As
such, their conduct raises copyright issues under the Copyright Act of
1976, 4 and trademark issues under the Lanham Act.5 The copyright
and trademark issues are particularly interesting, because many of
these third-party companies have created new editing or filtering
technologies that enable home viewers to create edited versions of
major Hollywood motion pictures. In one of the most recent
developments, RCA now offers a ClearPlay DVD player that comes
equipped with 100 pre-installed filters.
Courts will soon be called upon to resolve the copyright and
trademark issues raised by the creation of "E-Rated" movie versions
of original Hollywood films by, or with the assistance of, third-party
editing companies, as they address claims of copyright infringement
arising from unauthorized preparation of derivative works, and
trademark infringement arising from false designation of origin. Part I
of this article describes the factual background underlying the current
controversy. Next, Part II explains the copyright law background, and
Part III explains the trademark law background. Part IV examines
the third-party editing technologies that are currently in use, in light
of current copyright and trademark law. Then, Part V applies the
1. Edited for content to remove nudity and sexual situations, offensive language,
and graphic violence.
2. Steven Kent, Movie Moralists Take High-Tech Road, MSNBC NEWS, (Oct. 18,
2002), at http://www.msnbc.com/news/822999.asp (on file with author).
3. See [Plaintiffs'] Second Amended Complaint and Jury Demand, Huntsman v.
Soderbergh, No. 02-M-1662 (D. Colo. 2002) [hereinafter Complaint], available at
www.law.upenn.edu/polk/ideas/dec3/coates-packet.pdf.
4. 17 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. (2002).
5. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1125 & 1127 (2002).
6. See infra Parts IV. A. & B.
7. The Rugged Elegance Inspiration Network, News and Events, ClearPlay DVD
Player Now Available Exclusively at WalMart.com, at
http://www.ruggedelegantliving.com/a/002634.html (last visited Aug. 22, 2004) (on file with
author).
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principles of copyright and trademark law to these digital editing and
digital filtering technologies. As this analysis will show, the third-
party editing and filtering technologies infringe the exclusive rights of
the copyright owners, and the conduct of the third-party editing
companies should give rise to liability for false designation of origin.
Now looming on the horizon is the prospect of legislation that
will change existing law and legalize the activities of the third-party
editing companies. In 2004, the House passed the Family Movie Act
of 2004, H.R. 4586, in order to allow the movie filtering technology
companies to remove "offensive" content from motion pictures.8
Although the House bill did not pass the Senate before the close of
the 108th Congress, the legislation was revived in the 109th Congress,
and passed the Senate as the Family Movie Act of 2005 (FMA), S.
167.
The purpose of the legislation is to permit the makers of filtering
software and components to manufacture and distribute their
technologies without incurring liability,9 by clarifying "that the
skipping of audio or video content is not a violation of existing
copyright or trademark law." 10
This change in the law would significantly decrease the rights of
copyright owners and authors. As the conclusion of this article will
demonstrate, the FMA represents poor public policy, and it may
violate the United States' obligations under international law.
I. Background
The 1997 movie Titanic was a smash hit, earning millions at the
box office, praise from the critics, and eleven Oscars." The
phenomenal success of the film created a huge home-viewer demand
for VHS and DVD copies of the motion picture. 2 However, for a
small but distinct viewing audience there was one problem with what
8. Committee Approves Movie Filtering Technology Legislation, U.S. House of
Representatives Committee on the Judiciary, F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., Chairman,
News Advisory, available at http://www.house.gov/judiciary/news072104.htm (last visited
Aug. 22, 2004) (on file with author).
9. News on... Rednova, Device Lets Parents Edit DVDS for Kids, Ted Bridis, at
http://www.rednova.com/news/stories/2/2004/07/21/storyOO6.html (last visited Aug. 22,
2004) (on file with author).
10. Directors Guild Opposes Movie Filtering, DigitalMediaMagazine.net, at
http://www.streamingmag.com/listingsEntry.asp?ID=250280 (last visited Mar. 12, 2005)
(on file with author).
11. WorldwideBoxOffice, at http://www.worldwideboxoffice.com (last visited Feb. 12,
2003) (on file with author).
12 Id.
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would otherwise be a "family friendly" viewing experience-the
film's now famous nude scene. 3 Home-viewer demand for versions of
Titanic sans nude scene is credited with the creation of an entirely
new third-party editing industry.1 4 Viewers who strongly objected to
the nude scene in Titanic, yet wanted to rent or own copies of the
videotape or DVD, created a budding market for "E-Rated" versions
of Titanic and other popular Hollywood movies."
The birth of the third-party editing cottage industry is attributed
to Sunset Video of American Fork, Utah in 1998. Responding to
customers' requests for "sanitized" copies of Titanic, the videotape
sale and rental store began offering to delete the nude scene from
customer-owned videotapes of the film, and then began selling
videotape copies with the nude scene already deleted.16 Ray Lines
began editing copies of Titanic for friends and later began helping
Sunrise Video to alter Titanic digitally rather than splicing the
videotape." Lines realized there was a demand for edited versions of
other popular Hollywood movies and started his own editing service,
CleanFlicks, in 1999.18 CleanFlicks' 9 now offers edited versions of
more than 500 Hollywood movies in both video and DVD formats,
for sale and rental, at its website and 65 locations in 18 states. 
2
Since 1999, a number of other third-party editing companies have
sprung up in response to the gradual but steady demand for "E-
Rated" versions of Hollywood hit movies.2' As the number of such
companies has grown, so too has the dissatisfaction of Hollywood's
movie directors with the increasing alterations of their creative
13. Jack (Leonardo DiCaprio) sketching a semi-nude Rose (Kate Winslet).
14. Glen Warchol, Filmmakers Challenge Utah's Growing Industry of Video and
DVD Censors, SALT LAKE TRIB., Aug. 7, 2002, available at 2002 WL 25436908.
15. Id.
16. Scott Farwell, Utah-Based Video Chain's Nudity, Violence Edits Rile Hollywood,
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Dec. 12, 2002, available at 2002 WL 103870264.
17. Kent, supra note 2.
18. Farwell, supra note 16.
19. CleanFlicks is currently one of the counterdefendants in the Huntsman v.
Soderbergh controversy. See infra note 25 and accompanying text.
20. CleanFlicks Store Locations, at http://www.cleanflicks.com/index.php (last visited
Mar. 4, 2003) (on file with author). Thirty-four of these locations are in Utah.
21. Kent, supra note 2. But cf James Mann, Cleaning the World, One Lie at a Time,
INK19, (Sept. 2002), at http://www.ink19.com/issues/september2002/streaks/cleaning
WorldOneLie.html (describing nonexistent site, www.nogodvideos.com, containing Veggie
Tales videos edited for content to remove all references to "God, doing. good, or the
Bible.") (last visited Mar. 14 2004) (on file with author).
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works. '2 In March of 2002, Trilogy Studios, hoping to gain support for
its proprietary software editing technology, MovieMask, planned a
demonstration for Hollywood movie directors-but the plan
backfired) 3 The directors attending were not pleased to see that a
sword fight from The Princess Bride (1987) had been altered to look
like the characters were using Star Wars light sabers, or that the nude
scene from Titanic (1997) had been altered to cover Kate Winslet
with a digital corset)4
In an attempt to preempt a likely suit by the Directors Guild of
America (DGA) on behalf of its member directors, Robert
Huntsman2' and CleanFlicks of Colorado 26 filed suit in U.S. District
Court 27 against sixteen Hollywood movie directors.2 Huntsman and
CleanFlicks of Colorado sought a declaratory judgment that none of
the methodologies they use to provide edited versions of original
motion pictures to the public for private home viewing violate the
Copyright Act or the Lanham Act.29 The Directors Guild of America
(DGA) intervened on behalf of the sixteen motion picture directors
("Directors"), 3° joined eight31 major Hollywood motion picture
22. Rebecca Buckman, Mormons Shout 'Action' In Effort to Sugarcoat Hollywood-
Made Movies-Angry Directors Seek to Protect Their Work From Utah's Final Cut, ASIAN
WALL ST. J., Sept. 20, 2002, at Al, available at 2002 WL-WSJA 23017734.
23. Id.
24. Id; Roy Santos, First Look. Trilogy Studios MovieMask, DVD filtering software
lets you remove "objectionable material" from movies, TechTV Products & Reviews,
Software (Feb. 8, 2002), at http://www.techtv.com/products/software/story/
0,23008,3371490,00.html (story includes graphics displaying sample results of MovieMask
software masking of Titanic scenes) (on file with author).
25. Robert Huntsman is a patent and copyright attorney. See
http://www.bobhuntsman.com/current.htm (on file with author). Huntsman has applied for
a patent on digital filtering technology. Vince Horiuchi, Firm Sues, Seeks Ruling on Right
to Sanitize Films, SALT LAKE TRIB., Aug. 30, 2002, at
http://www.sltrib.com/2002/aug/08302002/utah/cleanflix.htm (last visited Dec. 30, 2002) (on
file with author).
26. CleanFlicks of Colorado is a franchisee of CleanFlicks of Pleasant Grove, Utah.
27. Complaint, supra note 3, at 3-4. The suit was filed in Denver, Colorado on August
29, 2002.
28. Steven Soderbergh, Robert Altman, Michael Apted, Taylor Hackford, Curtis
Hanson, Norman Jewison, John Landis, Michael Mann, Phillip Noyce, Brad Silberling,
Betty Thomas, Irwin Winkler, Martin Scorsese, Steven Spielberg, Robert Redford and
Sydney Pollack.
29. Complaint, supra note 3, at 6.
30. Orders on Motions at 1, Huntsman v. Soderbergh, No. 02-M-1662 (D. Colo.
2002); Directors Guild of America's Motion for Leave to Intervene at 1, Huntsman v.
Soderbergh, No. 02-M-1662 (D. Colo. 2002).
31. The eight studios joined in the suit are: Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Inc; Time Warner
Entertainment, a unit of AOL Time Warner Inc.; Sony Pictures Entertainment, a unit of
Sony Corp.; DreamWorks SKG LLC; Vivendi Universal SA's Universal City Studios;
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studios3 2 and eight 3 additional third-party editing companies as
necessary parties.34 The intervening parties raised claims of trademark
infringement and dilution in violation of the Lanham Act, due to the
unauthorized removal of original motion picture content.35
In addition, the joined Studios raised claims of copyright and
trademark law violations as a result of the preparation, distribution,
and sale of unauthorized altered versions of their original motion
pictures.36
Neither Huntsman nor CleanFlicks of Colorado claim ownership
of the motion picture copyrights for which they have provided edited
versions, or authorization to exercise any of the exclusive rights of the
copyright owners (the major Hollywood movie studios)-the
reproduction of the works in copies, the preparation of derivative
works, or the distribution of copies.37 Nor do they claim trademark
ownership or authorization with respect to the edited versions of the
motion pictures that they create, market, and sell. 8
As the owners of the motion picture works at issue, the Motion
Picture Studio Defendants ("Studios") sought declaratory and
injunctive relief (1) for infringement of their motion picture
copyrights under the Copyright Act,39 (2) for unfair competition, false
designation of origin, and false descriptions and representations in
commerce in violation of § 43 (a) of the Lanham Act,4° and (3) for
News Corp.'s Twentieth Century Fox; Paramount Pictures, a unit of Viacom Inc.; and
Walt Disney Co.
32. Orders on Motions at 1, Huntsman v. Soderbergh, No. 02-M-1662 (D. Colo.
2002); [DGA's] Motion to Compel Joinder of Third-Party Copyright Holders as Necessary
Parties Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19 and 17 U.S.C. § 501(b), Huntsman
v. Soderbergh, No. 02-M-1662 (D. Colo. 2002).
33. DGA moved to join Video II, Glen Dickman, and J.W.D. Management
Corporation; Trilogy Studios Inc.; CleanFlicks, CleanFilms (formerly MyCleanFlicks);
Family Shield Technologies, LLC; ClearPlay, Inc.; Clean Cut Cinemas; Family Safe
Media, EditMyMovies; and Family Flix, U.S.A L.L.C., Play It Clean Video.
34. Orders on Motions at 1, Huntsman v. Soderbergh, No. 02-M-1662 (D. Colo.
2002); [DGA's] Motion for Leave to Join Third Parties as Counterdefendants at 1,
Huntsman v. Soderbergh, No. 02-M-1662 (D. Colo. 2002).
35. Directors Guild of America's Motion for Leave to Intervene, supra note 30, at 3;
[DGA's] Motion for Leave to Join Third Parties as Counterdefendants, supra
note 34, at 2.
36. Motion Picture Studio Defendants' Answer and Counterclaims, Huntsman v.
Soderbergh, No. 02-M-1662 (D. Colo. 2002); Hollywood Studios Join Film-Sanitizing Suit
(Dec. 13, 2002), at http://www.reuters.com (on file with author).
37. See Complaint, supra note 3 and accompanying text.
3& Id.
39. 17 U.S.C. § 101 etseq. (2002).
40. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2002).
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trademark dilution in violation of § 43(c) of the Lanham Act.4 ' As the
creative artists responsible for the overall creative vision of the
motion picture works,42 the Motion Picture Director Defendants
("Directors") sought declaratory and injunctive relief for trademark
violations under the Lanham Act and state law.43
The third-party movie editing companies currently use two basic
technologies to create altered versions of the original motion picture
works-digital editing4 and digital filtering.45 In the case of digital
editing, the customer buys a movie on VHS or DVD and sends the
movie to the company for editing.46 If the customer does not already
own a copy of the movie, the customer can purchase one online at the
same time that she or he orders the editing service from the company.
The editing service companies make it appear that they edit the
actual VHS tape or DVD that the customer sends to them. However,
the company has already created a "master" copy of their edited
version of that particular movie. The company creates this master by
making an unauthorized copy of the original film, then altering the
unauthorized copy by using cut edits and volume muting to create an
unauthorized derivative work of the original. Finally, the company
copies the altered version from this "master" copy onto VHS or DVD
for distribution and sale to the home viewer. In the case where the
original version of the customer's movie is on VHS, in an effort to
make it appear that the editing process is a replacement for, rather
than a substitution for the original movie, the "master" is copied onto
the VHS tape originally purchased by the customer-that is, the
altered version is recorded over the original version.47 The original
tape, with the altered version copied over the original, is then placed
in the original packaging."8 In the case of DVDs, the customer's DVD
cannot be recorded over, so the company "burns" the altered version
41. Id. at § 1125(c); Motion Picture Studio Defendants' Answer and Counterclaims,
supra note 36.
42. Proposed Amended Counterclaim at 9-10, Huntsman v. Soderbergh, No. 02-M-
1662 (D. Colo. 2002).
43. Id at 16.
44. Digital editing companies use traditional cut and splice techniques to perform
their editing services. See infra Part IV. A.
45. Digital filtering companies use software programs to send commands, or filters to
a DVD player to tell it when to skip certain sounds and scenes. See infra Part IV. B.
46. See infra Part IV. A.
47. Id.
48. Kieth Merrill, Cleaning Up the Movies, Part I, MERIDIAN MAG. (June 4, 2002), at
http://www.meridianmagazine.com/arts/020604clean.html (on file with author).
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of the movie onto a blank DVD-R. The company returns the
customer's originally purchased DVD along with the new DVD
41
containing the altered version of the movie.
In contrast, third-party movie filtering companies create filtering
products consisting of two basic software components-filtering
application program (or in some cases, hardware microcomputer
chips), and a custom-made editing filter for each original motion
picture title that they plan to offer." When the home user plays their
original motion picture DVD, the filtering software application
program uses the custom-made "filter" to instruct the DVD player to
mute the volume or prevent a portion of the film from displaying,
while the original DVD itself remains unaltered.5
Both technologies raise issues under the Copyright Act and the
Lanham Act. Digital editing arguably involves direct copyright
infringement through the creation of unauthorized copies and
derivative works, as well as unauthorized public distribution of
derivative works.52 In contrast, digital filtering raises issues of
contributory copyright infringement:53 offering filtering software and
mask products for sale to the public arguably constitutes soliciting,
encouraging, and/or assisting home users to create unauthorized
derivative works-M based on the Studios' original motion pictures.55
The creation of these works by home users may arguably constitute
direct infringement.
Both editing technologies also raise trademark issues under
sections 43(a) and 43(c) of the Lanham Act. According to the
Studios, the digital editing companies' "continued use of the Studio
Trademarks on and in association with their unauthorized and
unlawful edited copies of the Studios' motion pictures is likely to
cause confusion in the marketplace; falsely and erroneously suggest a
connection or association with the Studios; and deceive consumers,
including both initial and subsequent purchasers, as to the source,
sponsorship and origin of such unlawfully edited motion pictures" in
violation of section 43(a).56 In addition, the Studios have argued that
49. Id.
50. See infra Part IV. B.
51. Id.
52. See infra Part II. A.
53. See infra Part II. B.
54. Id.
55. Motion Picture Studio Defendants' Answer and Counterclaims, supra note 36, at
5-6.
56. Id.
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continued use of their trademarks "in association with the
unauthorized and unlawful edited copies of [their] motion pictures
has diluted and will continue to dilute the distinctive quality of each
of [the] trademarks," in violation of section 43(c)."
H. Copyright Issues
Copyright law protects original works of authorship fixed in any
tangible medium of expression." "[M]otion pictures and other
audiovisual works"59 comprise one of eight specifically enumerated
categories of "original works of authorship" protected by the
Copyright Act.Y Copyright law seeks to balance copyright owners'
property interests in their creative works with the interests of the
public in the benefits of the creative works.6 In the case of a motion
picture, the copyright owner has the exclusive right to reproduce the
copyrighted work in copies, to create derivative works, to distribute
copies of the copyrighted work to the public, and to publicly perform
or display the work, as well as the exclusive right to authorize others
to engage in these activities. 62 Thus, the exclusive rights of
reproduction, modification, distribution, and public performance and
display are reserved for the copyright owner alone.63
Copyright infringement occurs whenever anyone other than the'
copyright owner exercises any of the exclusive rights in copyrighted
works without a statutory privilege or the authorization of the
copyright owner.64 None of the third-party editing companies claim
ownership of the copyrights of the motion pictures of which they
57. Id.
58. § 102. Subject matter of copyright: In general
(a) Copyright protection subsists... in original works of authorship fixed in any
tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed, from which they
can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with
the aid of a machine or device. Works of authorship include the following
categories: (1) literary works; (2) musical works, including any accompanying
words; (3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music; (4) pantomimes
and choreographic works; (5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works; (6) motion
pictures and other audiovisual works; (7) sound recordings; and (8) architectural
works.
17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2002).
59. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(6) (2002) (providing a non-exhaustive list of categories).
60. Id. at § 102.
61. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429, 431-32
(1984).
62. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2002).
63. See id.
64. 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (2002).
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provide edited versions.65 Nor do they claim authorization from the
copyright owners (the major Hollywood movie studios) to exercise
any of the exclusive rights of the copyright owners which are
implicated in these editing activities-the reproduction of the works
in copies, the preparation of derivative works, or the distribution of
copies.6
A. Direct Infringement
The copyright owner has the exclusive right (1) to reproduce the
copyrighted work in copies, (2) to prepare derivative works based on
the copyrighted work, and (3) to distribute copies of the copyrighted
work, or to authorize such copying, preparation of derivative works,
or distribution of copies.67 Direct infringement occurs when a party
has directly exercised, without consent or statutory privilege, one of
the exclusive rights reserved for the copyright owner.68
By statute, a derivative work is "a work based upon one or more
preexisting works." 69 For someone to be liable for copyright
infringement on the basis of preparation of a derivative work, the
derivative work "must incorporate a portion of the copyrighted work
71in some form."70 Thus, when third-party editing companies use
digital editing technology to create unauthorized altered versions of
copyrighted motion pictures by creating a "master" copy consisting of
picture and sound edits or other alterations,72 it may be argued that
they directly infringe the exclusive rights of the Studios to copy,
distribute, and create derivative works based on the latter's
copyrighted motion pictures.
Direct infringement may also take place when home users
operate digital filtering technology to alter the performance of their
DVDs at home. This is because the exclusive right to prepare
derivative works based on a copyrighted work may be infringed even
where no unauthorized copies have been created.73 Reproduction of a
65. Complaint, supra note 3 and accompanying text.
66. Id.
67. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1)-(3) (2002).
6& Sony, 464 U.S. at 434-35.
69. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2002).
70. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 62 (1976).
71. CleanFlicks, Video II, Clean Cut, Family Safe, and Family Flix.
72. See Proposed Amended Counterclaim, supra note 42 and accompanying text;
Motion Picture Studio Defendants' Answer and Counterclaims, supra note 36 and
accompanying text.
73. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 62 (1976).
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work "requires fixation in copies or phonorecords, '74 which requires
that its fixation in tangible form "is sufficiently permanent or stable to
permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for
a period of more than transitory duration."75 In contrast, in the case of
the exclusive right to create a derivative work, the legislative history
of the Copyright Act makes clear that the preparation of a derivative
work "may be an infringement even though nothing is ever fixed in
tangible form.,7 6 Thus, as discussed in Part V A. 2. below, an altered
performance of a DVD may be an infringement even if the alterations
are not recorded.
B. Contributory Infringement
Although section 501 of the Copyright Act refers simply to
copyright "infringement," 77 the federal courts have developed the
judicial doctrines of "direct" infringement and "contributory"
infringement.
Under the doctrine of contributory infringement "[o]ne who,
with knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, causes or
materially contributes to the infringing conduct of another, may be
held liable as a 'contributory' infringer. 79 Thus, the courts have held,
contributory infringement occurs when a defendant solicits,
encourages, or assists a direct infringement.
80
74. Id.
75. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2002).
76. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 62 (1976).
77. 17 U.S.C. § 501(b) (2002).
78. Courts developed the doctrines of direct infringement and contributory
infringement prior to the enactment of the Copyright Act of 1976. It was not Congress'
intention to supercede such doctrines with the passage of the Act, but to codify the state of
copyright law, including these common law developments. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal
City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 486 (1984) ("Although the liability provision of the 1976
Act provides simply that '[a]nyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of the copyright
owner... is an infringer of the copyright,' 17 U.S.C. § 501(a), the House and Senate
Reports demonstrate that Congress intended to retain judicial doctrines of contributory
infringement. 1975 Senate Report 57; 1976 House Report 61.")
79. Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d
Cir. 1971); see also Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 264 (9th Cir. 1996)
("Contributory infringement has been described as an outgrowth of enterprise liability ...
and imposes liability where one person knowingly contributes to the infringing conduct of
another."). Or as stated by another court: liability exists where the defendant engages in
"personal conduct that encourages or assists the infringement." Matthew Bender & Co. v.
West Publ'g Co., 158 F.3d 693, 706 (2d Cir. 1998).
80. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,435 (1984).
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If the conduct of home viewers directly infringes the Studios'
motion picture copyrights, then it is possible that the makers s' and
vendors of these filtering services have engaged in contributory
infringement.
According to the contributory infringement doctrine, therefore,
regardless of whether the conduct of the -thitd-party editing
companies directly infringes, if creation and distribution of filtering
technologies enables the home user to directly infringe the Studios'
exclusive rights of reproduction or preparation of derivative works,
then the third-party editing companies may be liable'for contributory
infringement. Arguably, therefore, third-party editing companies
contributorily infringe by offering hardware or software digital
filtering technologies that assist home users in removing
"objectionable" content. This argument is explored in greater detail
in Part V A. below.
C. Fair Use
However, the exclusive rights of the copyright owner are not
unlimited. Thus, not all unauthorized uses of copyrighted works are
infringing.2 Under section 107 of the Copyright Act,8 some
unauthorized uses of the exclusive rights are considered to be fair use
of the author's work, e.g., "criticism, comment, news reporting,
teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or
research."8 Thus, even if the third-party editing companies create
unauthorized copies or derivative works of the studios' motion
pictures, or assist home users in doing so, the companies will not be
liable for direct or contributory infringement if such unauthorized
works constitute fair use of the motion pictures.
Courts consider four major factors in determining whether the
use of a particular copyrighted work is fair: "(1) the purpose and
character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial
nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the nature of the
copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion
used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect
of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted
work."8' Other relevant factors may also be considered, however,
81. ClearPlay, MovieMask, and MovieShield.
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since "fair use is an 'equitable rule of reason' 86 to be applied in light of
the overall purposes of the Copyright Act."' Thus, the third-party
editing companies will not be liable for copyright infringement if, in
light of the section 107 factors, their conduct represents fair use of the
Studios' motion pictures. The fair use analysis is relevant both to the
conduct of the defendants in making their edited versions or creating
their filtering software, and to the conduct of home users in utilizing
the filtering software to create altered performances of the
copyrighted motion pictures.
D. Substantial Non-infringing Uses
Finally, even if the home users' activities do not constitute fair
use, so that the third-party editing companies are found to facilitate
direct infringements by home users, the editing companies can avoid
contributory liability if they can demonstrate that their technologies
are capable of substantial non-infringing uses." For example, in Sony
Corporation of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., Universal
claimed that some home viewers had engaged in direct copyright
infringement because they had recorded some of Universal's
copyrighted works from commercially sponsored television
broadcasts using Sony's Betamax video tape recorders ("VTRs"). 89
Universal claimed that Sony was liable for contributory copyright
infringement, because Sony had marketed the VTRs to consumers. 9°
The Supreme Court held that Sony's sale of the Betamax VTRs did
not constitute contributory infringement of Universal's copyrights
because the VTRs were capable of substantial non-infringing uses.9'
The Court reasoned that "the sale of copying equipment, like the sale
of other articles of commerce, does not constitute contributory
infringement if the product is widely used for legitimate,
unobjectionable purposes, ' 2 adding that "it need merely be capable
of substantial non-infringing uses." Although the Court noted that the
substantial non-infringing uses must also be "commercially
86. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 65-66 (1976).
87. UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349, 350 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)
(citing Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 448, 454 (1984)).
Some courts, for example, have considered the defendant's good faith (or lack thereof) to
be a relevant factor. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539,
562-563 (1985); Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 585 (1994).
88. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,440-42 (1984).
89. Id. at 420.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 456.
92- Id. at 442.
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significant," the Court determined that one such potential non-
infringing use by Betamax users was "private, noncommercial time-
shifting in the home"-recording the broadcast for viewing at a later,93
more convenient time-which the Court found to be a fair use.
Thus, third-party digital editing companies may avoid liability for
contributory infringement if their products are capable of substantial
non-infringing uses, even if they have enabled home users to directly
infringe. The challenge will be to identify what those substantial non-
infringing uses might be.
III. Trademark Issues
A. Federal Unfair Competition Under the Lanham Act-Section 43(a)
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act prohibits unfair competition
through the use of a false designation of origin, or a false designation
or representation in connection with any goods and services in the
stream of commerce, if it is likely to cause consumer confusion. 94 In
most states, the state law of trademark or unfair competition is similar
to the Lanham Act. Thus, under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, as
well as the relevant state law, associating the name of a person or
company, such as a film director, producer, or studio, with a mutilated
version of the person's or company's creation, such as an edited film,
may be actionable as a false designation of origin.
For example in Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Co., Inc.," the
Second Circuit held that ABC violated section 43(a) of the Lanham
Act when it extensively edited Monty Python episodes to fit time
constraints and insert commercials, because the resulting broadcast
misrepresented the origin of the altered episodes by identifying the
Monty Python troupe as the source of these episodes.9 Similarly, in
King v. Innovation Books,97 the Second Circuit held that an
attribution of possessory credit, "Stephen King's The Lawnmower
Man," was false on its face because, although the film was loosely
93. Id. In addition, the Court found that many producers of television programming
had no objection to consumer copying of their programs, so that copying of those
programs constituted a second non-infringing use. Id. at 446-47.
94. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a).
95. 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976).
96. Id. at 25.
97. 976 F.2d 824 (2d Cir. 1992).
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based on a short story written by Stephen King, the latter "had no
involvement in, and gave no approval of [the] screenplay or movie." 98
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Dastar Corporation v.
Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation,99 however, casts doubt on
the long relied-on Second Circuit holdings in Gilliam and Innovation
Books."°° As discussed in Part V, below, correct interpretation of
Dastar could be crucial to the analysis of section 43(a) claims arising
from the activities of third-party editors.
B. Federal Trademark Dilution Under the Lanham Act-Section 43(c)
Section 43(c) provides that the owner of a famous mark is
entitled to enjoin the commercial use of that mark by another, if the
use occurs after the mark is already famous and results in the dilution
of the famous mark.1 1 To the extent that third-party movie editing
companies create and distribute unauthorized altered versions of
motion pictures directed by the Directors and created, financed,
produced, and distributed by the Studios, they may also face liability
for dilution under section 43(c) of the Lanham Act.1' And, to the
extent that the third-party movie filtering companies create and
distribute filtering products that enable unauthorized altered
performances of motion pictures, they too may face liability under
section 43(c).
Dilution exists whenever the capacity of a famous mark to
identify and distinguish goods or services is lessened, regardless of
whether or not there is competition between the owner of the mark
and anyone else, and even in the absence of likelihood of confusion,
mistake, or deception.'0 3 By altering the Directors' original vision and
9& Id. at 829. Conversely, in Choe v. Fordham University School of Law, 920 F
Supp. 44 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), a federal district court held that the publication of a law review
article had not violated section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, because the alleged alterations
(scores of typographical and substantive errors) of the plaintiff's Comment did not rise to
the level of the radically altered content found to be a misrepresentation in Gilliam, and
therefore did not present Choe as the creator of a work not his own. Id. at 48-49.
99. 539 U.S. 23 (2003).
100. E.g., Abend v. MCA, Inc., 863 F.2d 1465, 1473-74 (9th Cir. 1988); Carter v.
Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 71 F.3d 77, 82 (2d Cir. 1995); Board of Managers of Soho
International Arts Condominium v. City of New York, 2003 WL 21403333, 17 (S.D.N.Y.
2003).
101. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1).
102. However, in 1995 Congress passed the Federal Trademark Dilution Act
("FTDA") for the purpose of extending the Lanham Act federal trademark protection to
include dilution of "famous marks" regardless of any competitive activity or likelihood of
confusion. Id at § 1125 (3).
103. 15 U.S.C. § 1127.
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artistic choices, the third-party editing company technologies
arguably reduce the ability of the Directors' famous marks-their
names-to distinguish and identify their unique directorial styles and
artistry. Similarly, by altering motion pictures created, developed, and
distributed by the Studios, arguably these companies have diminished
the capacity of the Studios' famous marks to uniquely distinguish and
identify their creative works.
For purposes of federal trademark dilution law, mere likelihood
of dilution is not sufficient-actual dilution of the famous mark must
exist. ° However, it is not necessary to prove an actual loss of sales or
profits to show that actual dilution exists.1 In Moseley v. V Secret
Catalogue, Inc., the Supreme Court concluded "that direct evidence
of dilution such as consumer surveys will not be necessary if actual
dilution can reliably be proven through circumstantial evidence-the
obvious case is one where the junior and senior marks areidentical."'06
As already described, the digital editing technologies return the
original packaging along with the altered versions of the original
motion pictures on videotape or CD to the consumer.1' In such a
scenario, the marks are unquestionably identical. In the case of the
digital filtering products, the software filter is created, marketed,
distributed, and sold as the filter for a particular movie.) To the
extent that the third-party filterers use the name of the film, Studio,
Producer, or Director to describe the use of the filter for a particular
original film, the marks are arguably identical. And in each case, the
screen credits naming these parties as the originators of the now-
altered work remain intact, causing viewers to associate the altered
film with the original creators and their marks.
C. Trademark Dilution Under State Law
Thirty-four states now have trademark anti-dilution statutes with
protections that parallel or exceed the protections afforded by the
current Lanham Act.1°9 Accordingly, the Studios, Directors and
104. Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418,432 (2003).
105. Id.
106. Id at 433.
107. See infra Part IV. A.
108. See infra Part IV. B.
109. Paul Edward Kim, Preventing Dilution of the Federal Trademark Dilution Act:
Why the FTDA Requires Actual Economic Harm, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 719, 726 n.35 (2001).
Prior to the 1996 amendments to the Lanham Act, twenty-five states had enacted
trademark anti-dilution statutes that provided trademark protection extending beyond the
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Producers may be able to raise state law dilution claims as well. In
some cases where the state laws differ from section 43(c) of the
Lanham Act, their standards may be easier for the complaining
parties to satisfy. In New York, for example, a party claiming dilution
need not establish that its mark is famous, and need establish only a
likelihood of dilution, rather than actual dilution."'
IV. Third-Party Editing Technologies
Third-party editors currently use either of two basic editing
technologies to remove "objectionable" sounds and scenes from
motion pictures. The two technologies are digital editing and digital
filtering."' Because there are significant differences in the
mechanisms involved in these technologies, the copyright and
trademark analyses may not be the same for each of them. Thus, to
analyze the copyright and trademark issues raised by third-party
editing technologies, it is important to understand how the
technologies differ.
A. Digital Editing Services
Digital editing technology is the digital counterpart of
conventional film and videotape splicing techniques. Instead of
physically cutting and splicing a VHS videotape, the original movie is
copied from the videotape to a computer equipped with editing
software where the cuts are made digitally. 12 The original movie is
likelihood of confusion standard provided by federal trademark law. H.R. REP. No. 104-
374, at 3-4 (1995) ("A federal dilution statute is necessary because famous marks
ordinarily are used on a nationwide basis and dilution protection is currently only
available on a patch-quilt system of protection, in that only approximately 25 states have
laws that prohibit trademark dilution."). "State trademark dilution statutes can be divided
into four categories: (1) those that follow the United States Trademark Association
(USTA) 1964 Model State Trademark Bill; (2) those that follow the USTA 1988 Model
State Trademark Bill; (3) those that follow neither model, but follow a "variation" of the
USTA 1964 Model Bill; and (4) those that adopt the FTDA as adapted for famous marks
within a state." K. Keith Facer, The Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995: A Whittling
Away of State Dilution Statutes, 10 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 863, 884-85 (2000). Arkansas
is the only state so far to adopt the language of the FTDA. Id at 885 n.92. For example,
the California state dilution statute and section 43(c) of the Lanham Act have provided for
essentially the same rights. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 14330(a). Courts have determined
parties' rights using the same analysis for both federal and state law claims. Panavision
Intern., L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1324 (9th Cir. 1998).
110. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 360-i (McKinney Supp. 2001). See also, Nat'l Distillers
Prod Co., LLC v. Refreshment Brands, Inc., 198 F. Supp. 2d 474, 486 (S.D.N.Y. 2002);
Allied Main. Corp. v. Allied Mech. Trades, Inc., 369 N.E.2d 1162 (1977).
111. Merrill, supra note 48.
112. Id
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erased from the original videotape and the edited version is then
recorded onto the original videotape. For a DVD, the copying and
digital cutting steps are the same as for videotape, but the edited
version cannot be recorded back onto the original DVD, which will
not accept recording. The edited version has to be "burned" onto a
new DVD-R (recordable DVD).,
CleanFlicks, Clean Films, and Family Flix all use digital editing
to remove content that they deem "objectionable." '113 First, the
"objectionable" content is identified, and then those portions of the
picture and volume are cut or muted to delete the objectionable
content, or alter it in some other way, so that it is effectively removed
from the original work. 4 CleanFlicks of Colorado creates a master
edited version of each film, then copies its master edited/altered
version of each film onto the VHS videocassette (still bearing the
original label), which originally contained the authorized, unedited
version of the film.115
Clean Films rents edited DVDs to customers through a co-
operative rental club. Its website states: "All subscribers to our
service become members of the Co-op. The Co-op collectively
purchases original, unedited DVD movies[,] then has them edited-
always maintaining a 1:1 ratio of edited and non-edited originals."'16
The Family Flix service involves a similar process. The customer
may send their DVD original copy of the movie along with its original
case, or purchase the original directly from Family Flix. 17 In both
cases, Family Flix will then "disable the original DVD and adhere it
to the original case and put the edited DVD in its place.' 18
B. Digital Filtering Products
In contrast to digital editing, digital filtering technologies do not
alter the home viewer's DVD. Digital filtering products consist of
software applications or hardware components and custom-made
software instructions. A set of software instructions is custom-made
for each original motion picture DVD to be "edited for content." The
digital editing companies variously refer to their sets of software
113. Id.
114. Complaint, supra note 3, at 3-4.
115. Motion for Leave to Join Third Parties as Counterdefendants, supra note 34, at 4.
116. About Edited Movies (Dec. 26, 2002), at http://www.cleanfilms.com/
about edited.phtml (on file with author).
117. DVD Information (July 21, 2003), at http://www.familyflix.net/dvds.htm (on file
with author).
118. Id.
ON A CLEARPLAY. YOU CAN SEE WHATEVER9(10 ]
editing instructions as "filters," "templates," "masks," or "guides.90 19
The custom-made software instructions are specifically created to
correspond to the "objectionable" video and sound of a particular
motion picture. To alter content, the software program or specially
equipped DVD player runs the "filter" or "mask" while the original
motion picture DVD is playing.
To understand the operation of filtering technologies, it is helpful
to understand the operation of motion picture DVDs. DVD versions
of original motion pictures are created by converting the analog
motion picture, originally shot on 35mm movie film, to digital code,
then into compressed MPEG-2 format, and finally recorded onto
DVD'2 ° To view a movie recorded on DVD, the computer or
standalone DVD player translates the compressed digital
representation back into the pictures and sounds of the original
film.1
21
Both ClearPlay and MovieMask produce and market digital
filtering technologies. 22 ClearPlay creates software filters called
"guides" corresponding to video and audio content deemed to be
"objectionable."' Using the filtering "guides," ClearPlay's control
software program activates the DVD player's Skip and Mute
functions to edit out the "objectionable" sounds and images.124
Trilogy Studios' digital filtering product-called Movie Mask-
uses its own proprietary software editing program and "mask" files
developed specifically for each movie to enable the movie edits215 The
MovieMask editing filters are designed to be used in conjunction with
Trilogy's proprietary software, which controls the DVD player's
MPEG-2 decoder at the frame level of accuracy. This software allows
for more finely tuned skips and mutes when using the MovieMask
119. Kieth Merrill, Cleaning Up the Movies, Part II, MERIDIAN MAG. (June 4, 2002),
at http://www.meridianmagazine.com/arts/020904clean.html (on file with author).
120. Merrill, supra note 48.
121. Id.
122. Kieth Merrill, Cleaning Up the Movies, Part II, MERIDIAN MAG. (June 4, 2002),
at http://www.meridianmagazine.com/arts020904clean.html (on file with author).
123. Merrill, supra note 48.
124. Id. ClearPlay created its DVD player control software using Microsoft
DirectShow.
125. Roy Santos, First Look: Trilogy Studios MovieMask, at
http://www.techtv.com/products/software/story/0,23008,3371490,00.html (last visited Dec.
26, 2002) (on file with author).
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. [27:567
editing filter to remove offensive scenes and sounds."" Its proprietary
decoder works frame by frame."'
The first step in the design of the editing filters takes place when
a Review Board made up of members internal and external to Trilogy
Software decides what content in each movie is considered to be
offensive.9 After the "objectionable" content has been identified, the
editing filter necessary to suppress the display of the video and/or
sound of the "objectionable" material is created.' 29 The resulting
motion picture display incorporates the DVD's original content and
the edited portions with the "objectionable" content removed.
30
Other editing technologies consist of hardware as well as
software components. Family Shield Technologies markets a filtering
product called MovieShield."' The product consists of one hardware
component that downloads custom-made software editing filters,
called "shields."" 2 Another electronic device connects between the
home viewer's VCR or DVD player and television set and processes
the "shield" edits downloaded from their website. 3' The device uses
the "shield" edits and the NTSC 34 line 21 closed captioning time-
code"35 to activate the skipping and muting functions on the DVD
player to create an altered performance of the original motion
picture. 3
Family Safe Media markets a product called TV Guardian as a
stand-alone device, or as a device pre-installed in several name brand
126. MovieMask FAQ, at http://www.moviemask.comfaq.php (last visited Mar. 4,
2003) (on file with author).
127. Santos, supra note 125.
128. MovieMask FAQ, supra note 126.
129. Id.
130. See Motion for Leave to Join Third Parties as Counterdefendants at 4-5,
Huntsman v. Soderbergh, No. 02-M-1662 (D. Colo. 2002) (arguing that these "software
products effectively create a new version of a director's work by removing content that the
counterdefendants deem 'objectionable' using a 'mask' or 'guide' to mute the sound or
skip over portions of movies during playback.").
131. About MovieShield, at http://www.movieshield.com/about.htm (last visited Dec.
27,2002) (on file with author).
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Internet.com Webopedia, (The National Television System Committee "is
responsible for setting television and video standards in the United States."), at
http://www.webopedia.com/ERM/N/NTSC.htmil (last visited Feb. 14, 2004) (on file with
author).
135. Glossary of Captioning Terms, (The electronic signal embedded in a videotape
that discretely identifies each frame of video), at www.ezdvdadvisor.com/public/500.cfm
(last visited Feb. 14, 2004) (on file with author).
136. About MovieShield, supra note 131.
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DVD/VCR players, which mutes "offensive" words and phrases and
substitutes a sanitized version. 37 TV Guardian uses both the closed
captioned hearing timing signal and the closed captioned hearing text
display (provided for hearing impaired viewers) to control the
playback of offensive language only, not objectionable scenes. 18 A
programmed microcomputer within the device checks the closed
caption signal text against a stored database of objectionable words,
mutes the offending word, substitutes a sanitized word from the
database, and displays the replacement word as text on the closed
captioned text display line of the viewer's television set."' RCA now
offers a ClearPlay DVD player that comes equipped with 100 pre-
installed filters.14°
Although the processes differ, both digital filtering and digital
editing yield the same kind of altered audiovisual performance--an
edited version of the original motion picture. Both processes create a
motion picture performance that combines a substantial portion of
the original motion picture with the unauthorized "editorial
revisions" of the third-party editing companies. However, only digital
editing technology creates a tangible permanent copy, because
software filtering technology leaves the consumer's DVD unaltered 1
V. Analysis
A careful application of these principles of copyright and unfair
competition law to third-party editing involves a multi-step analysis.
First, to determine whether the third-party editing companies' use of
digital editing or digital filtering technologies constitutes copyright
infringement, it must initially be determined whether any
unauthorized exercise of the copyright holders' exclusive rights has
occurred. As discussed below, the right to make and distribute copies
and the right to create derivative works are implicated in the analysis.
Next, it must be determined whether the statutory privilege of fair use
permits some or all of those uses. Finally, if the home users are
137. TV Guardian Q & A, at http://www.tvguardian.com/html/qanda.html (last visited
Dec. 26, 2002) (on file with author).
138. Frequently Asked Questions, at http://www.tvguardian.comhtml/qanda.html (last
visited Dec. 26,2002) (on file with author).
139. Id.
140. The Rugged Elegance Inspiration Network, News and Events, ClearPlay DVD
Player Now Available Exclusively at WalMart com, at http://www.ruggedelegantliving.com/
a/002634.html (last visited Aug. 22,2004) (on file with author).
141. Although if fixation in RAM is sufficient, maybe both versions are fixed. See infra
note 190 and accompanying text.
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engaged in infringing activities, it must still be determined whether
the editing companies can avoid contributory liability by showing that
there are any substantial non-infringing uses for their products.
The Lanham Act analysis under section 43(a) focuses on whether
the act of distributing the altered films or the filtering products
involves a false designation of the origin of those films, by
misrepresenting the altered films as the product of the original film's
creative contributors. In contrast, the Lanham Act analysis under
section 43(c) turns on whether distribution of the altered films or the
filtering products dilutes the distinctive quality of the studios' or
directors' famous trademarks, even if it does not involve a false
designation of origin.
A. Copyright Issues
Determining whether the use of digital editing or digital filtering
technologies involves copyright infringement requires posing several
questions about each technology: (1) Does the creation of a digitally
edited DVD or VHS version of a film constitute direct copyright
infringement through the unauthorized creation of either a derivative
work or a copy? (2) Do home users infringe the motion picture
copyrights when they use filtering products to alter only the
audiovisual performance of copyrighted films? (3) If so, are the
producers of digital filtering software contributorily liable for the
home users' direct infringements? (4) Regardless of whether the
altered audiovisual performance is itself infringing, does the creation
of the filtering software itself involve infringing reproduction, or is it a
type of permissible reverse engineering which qualifies as fair use?
Each of these questions will be addressed in turn.
1. Direct Infringement by Digital Editing
As discussed in Part IV A, digital editing (as opposed to filtering)
involves physical copying and distribution of altered versions of
copyrighted films. 42 To make the altered versions available to their
customers, the companies first create an intermediate copy of the
film, then place that copy into a digital editing software application.
The companies then use the digital editing program to create the
altered version by removing the "objectionable" picture and sound
portions of the original motion picture and saving the result to a
"master" copy. Finally, the companies copy the altered version from
142. See supra Part IV. A.
2005] ON A CLEARPLAY, YOU CAN SEE WHATEVER
the digital "master" onto the customer's VHS tape or DVD and
return it to the customer. 43
The law is clear that these activities constitute unauthorized
copying. In UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc.,'" for example,
MP3.com had offered its My.MP3.com Internet CD storage service to
subscribers. To make the copies available to its subscribers, MP3.com
purchased tens of thousands of plaintiffs' CDs and converted these
recordings to MP3 files, which it then stored on its server. 145 The court
held that MP3.com had directly infringed the plaintiffs' exclusive
rights to copy their sound recordings.' 46 MP3.com had claimed that its
service was the "functional equivalent" of storing its subscribers' CDs
so that subscribers could store, customize, and listen to their
recordings from any computer with an Internet connection. 47
However, the federal district court concluded that MP3.com was in
fact reproducing and distributing copies of the MP3'" files it had
copied and converted from plaintiffs' copyrighted CDs without
authorization. 14 The court found that such copying gave rise to a
presumptive case of copyright infringement.1
50
In a similar manner, the activities of the third-party editing
companies that actually create altered DVDs and VHS tapes give rise
to a prima facie case of direct infringement of the copyright owners'
exclusive rights to copy and distribute their motion pictures, and to
prepare derivative works based on those films. The editing
companies' "master" copy of the altered version is both a copy and a
derivative work of the original copyrighted motion picture, because it
incorporates almost all of the original film-all but the
"objectionable" portions of the film-and it also constitutes a new
work-or "adaptation"-based on the preexisting original film. The
companies then make multiple copies of the altered works, thus
engaging in additional unauthorized copying. 5' Moreover, the
intermediate unaltered copy-the one that is used to create the edited
master-is itself an unauthorized copy that serves no other purpose
143. Id.
144. UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MIP3.com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
145. Id. at 350.
146. Id. at 353.
147. Id. at 350.
148. See generally Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys Inc.,
180 F.3d 1072, 1073-74 (9th Cir. 1999).
149. MP3.com, 92 F. Supp. 2d at 350.
150. Id.
151. See supra Part IV. A.
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than to facilitate creation of the unauthorized derivative work, and
thus gives rise to another instance of prima facie direct infringement,
but one that is potentially rebuttable if the intermediate copying
activity constitutes fair use.52 Finally, the copyright owners' exclusive
right to distribute copies of their motion pictures is directly infringed
when the editing companies distribute copies of the altered motion
pictures by selling them to their customers.
Even if the creation and distribution of these altered films is
unauthorized use by the digital editing services, the use may not be
infringing if it is a fair. use. Using the four-factor statutory analysis
under section 107, however, the digital companies will be unlikely to
prevail in an argument for fair use. The purpose and character of the
use is commercial, the nature of the copyrighted work is creative, and
almost the entire film is being copied. Thus, three of the four factors
strongly disfavor fair use in the case of digital editing. As to the fourth
factor-the effect of the use upon the potential market for, or value
of, the copyrighted work-even if the digital editing services were to
increase the sales of the original motion picture, the sale of such
services invades the potential market of the copyright owners who
might have wanted someday to produce their own edited versions of
their films in order to exploit this derivative market.5 3 Indeed, the
copyright owners might have produced edited versions of their own
films that would have been of higher quality than the unauthorized
versions produced by the editing companies.
The fair use analysis of the digital editing of DVDs is very similar
to the fair use analysis of the Internet CD storage services offered in
MP3.com. As noted earlier, in order to offer its My.MP3.com
Internet CD storage service to subscribers, defendant MP3.com
purchased tens of thousands of plaintiffs' CDs and copied the
recordings as MP3 files onto its server.5 4 Defendant MP3.com
claimed that its acts of copying the plaintiffs' CDs were non-infringing
because they were protected by fair use."' The district court
considered the statutory fair use factors and held that fair use did not
apply. 56 The purpose of the use was commercial, because, although
MP3.com did not charge its customers at the time, it had plans to do
152. The fair use issue is addressed in Part V.A.3. infra.
153. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 592-94 (1994) (noting that the
plaintiffs might have been interested someday in producing their own rap derivative of
their copyrighted song).
154. MP3.com, 92 F. Supp. 2d 349, 350.
155. Id. at 350.
156. Id. at 352.
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so in the future."' The use did not transform the new work, because
the mere conversion into another medium did not add anything new
to the already existing work.15 The nature of the copied material-
musical works-placed these copyrightable works closer "to the core
of intended copyright protection than others." '159 Thus the first two
fair use factors did not favor fair use."'
The MP3.com court also found that the third fair use factor-the
amount and substantiality of the use-favored the plaintiffs.16' The
MP3 music files had been distributed and copied in their entirety
when users downloaded the files to their personal computers and
replayed them.
As to the fourth factor, the court concluded that defendant
MP3.com's activities had affected the potential market for plaintiffs'
works by "invad[ing] plaintiffs' statutory right to license their
copyrighted sound recordings to others for reproduction."1 62
Defendant MP3.com argued that its services would only increase
plaintiffs' sales because subscribers to its service could not gain access
unless they purchased their own copy of the recordings. The district
court did not agree, finding that even if there were such a positive
affect on sales in a prior market, the defendant was not free to take a
future, as-yet undeveloped market from the plaintiffs.' 16
In MP3.com the court found the purpose and character of the
use to be commercial and nontransformative. Digital editing of films,
in contrast, is commercial but transformative which would appear to
make digital editing a stronger case for fair use. However, the
commerciality of the use more than counterbalances its
transformative aspect. On balance therefore, the first fair use factor is
still likely to favor the plaintiffs. As in MP3.com, the other three fair
use factors all weigh against fair use. Accordingly, in light of the close
parallel between digital editing services and the services at issue in
MP3.com, the activities of digital editing companies should not
qualify as fair use.
157. Id. at 351.
158. Id. The court rejected the defendant's "space shifting" argument.
159. Id. at 351-52 (quoting Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 586
(1994)). For example, where the work is a fictional story, a motion picture, or other
creative work, fair use will be harder to establish than where the work is a factual account,
a news broadcast, or some other factual work.
160. MP3.com, 92 F. Supp. 2d at 351-52.
161. Id. at 352.
162. Id.
163. Id.
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2. Digital Filtering
a. Direct Infringement by Creation of Intermediate Copy
In contrast to those engaging in digital editing, the companies
using digital filtering technologies do not engage in the same kind of
infringing activities as digital editing companies, because they do not
create or distribute physical copies of altered DVDs or VHS tapes.
However, their activities may nonetheless give rise to liability for
direct copyright infringement.
Digital filtering companies must make an intermediate copy of
each motion picture in order to map out the precise areas to be
targeted by their respective ' content filters ("guides," "masks," or
"shields"). As in the case of digital editing, this intermediate copy
gives rise to a prima facie case of direct infringement, rebuttable only
upon a showing of fair use. Whether fair use can be established in
such a case is discussed in Part V A. 2. b. below.
b. Direct Infringement by Home Users of Filtering Software, and
Contributory Infringement by Digital Filtering Companies
Unlike digital editing, which implicates only direct infringement,
digital filtering raises questions of contributory as well as direct
infringement. In digital filtering, the altered version of the movie is
created not by the third-party company, but by the home user. Thus,
the filtering companies do not directly create an infringing derivative
work. Rather, the issue is whether the filtering companies enable
home users to create an infringing derivative work because their
digital filters facilitate the creation of an altered performance by
home users. If so, then the digital filtering companies face potential
contributory liability for their customers' direct infringements.
Contributory liability will be addressed first, followed by direct
infringement by home users.
(i) Contributory Liability
Contributory liability arises when a defendant solicits,
encourages, or assists a direct infringement.164 That is, another
infringer (in this case, the home user) must directly exercise one of
the exclusive rights reserved for the copyright owner without
164. See supra Part II. B.
2005]
authorization, 16 and the defendant must have assisted the direct
infringer in exercising one of those exclusive rights.
1 66
The Napster 67 case provides an example. In A&M Records, Inc.
v. Napster, Inc., 68 Napster created an Internet subscription service
designed to assist subscribers to the Napster service in locating,
exchanging, and copying MP3 music files supplied by one another.
69
The Ninth Circuit held that Napster subscribers had directly infringed
the copyright owners' exclusive rights of reproduction and
distribution by exchanging these copyrighted music files. Specifically,
the court found that Napster users had directly infringed the
copyright owners' distribution rights by uploading the music file
names to the search index on Napster's servers for others to copy, and
had infringed their reproduction rights by downloading the
copyrighted music. In addition, the court held Napster liable for
contributory infringement, because Napster had actively solicited
users to subscribe to its Internet service that had been specifically
designed as an MP3 file exchange and copying service. 17 The court
found that Napster had actual knowledge of direct infringement by its
users, that its services had no substantial non-infringing uses, and that
Napster was therefore contributorily liable for the infringing activities
of its users.71
Similarly, digital filtering companies may be contributorily liable
for knowingly assisting home users in creating unauthorized
derivative works, if the filtering software has no substantial non-
infringing uses.172 However, the question of contributory liability turns
on the underlying question of whether home users of the digital
filtering technology have committed a direct infringement by creating
an unauthorized derivative work each time they use the filtering
technology to alter the performance of a copyrighted film.
165. See supra Part II. A.
166. See supra Part II. B.
167. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
168. Id.
169. Id. at 1014.
170. Id. at 1022.
171. Id. at 1020.
172. But see Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 259 F. Supp. 2d
1029, (C.D. Cal. 2003) (holding that defendants were not contributorily liable because
their internet file sharing system software had substantial non-infringing uses). See also
supra Part V. A. 4.
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(ii) Direct Infringement by Home Users
The question of whether the technologically altered performance
created by a home user employing filtering software is an infringing
derivative work is perhaps the most difficult issue posed by the digital
filtering technologies, because the altered performance does not
involve a physical or permanent change to the DVD, only a transitory
change in the audiovisual display when the DVD is performed.
Courts addressing analogous facts arising under earlier
technologies have reached conflicting conclusions. In Lewis Galoob
Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of Am. Inc.,' 73 for example, Nintendo
manufactured the Nintendo Entertainment System, a home video
game system that played video game cartridges produced or licensed
by Nintendo. 4 Galoob manufactured the Game Genie, a device that
allowed a player to alter up to three features of a Nintendo game
cartridge at the same time. The player would attach the Game Genie
to the game cartridge and insert the Game Genie and cartridge into
the Nintendo System to play the altered version of the game. 175 The
Ninth Circuit court held that the audiovisual performance created by
the Game Genie was not itself a derivative work, because the Game
Genie did not physically incorporate a portion of the Nintendo
game. 176 The court stated that "[a] derivative work must incorporate a
protected work in some concrete or permanent 'form."" In other
words, the underlying work must be physically contained in the
derivative work.78 Therefore, the court concluded, if only the
performance of the work was altered, the protected work was not
"incorporated" and thus was not infringed.
However, the Ninth Circuit's statement of the law in Galoob was
inaccurate. Nowhere does the statutory definition of a derivative
work require incorporation of the underlying work in a "concrete or
permanent" form. Rather, the section 101 definition simply refers to
"any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or
adapted." '179 The statute illustrates this with a list of examples: "a
translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization,
motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction,
173. Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of Am. Inc., 964 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1992)
[hereinafter Galoob].
174. Id. at 967.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 968-69.
177. Id. at 967 (emphasis added).
178. Id.
179. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2002).
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abridgement, condensation, or any other form in which a work may
be recast, transformed, or adapted."' 8 The 1976 House Report
confirms that, to constitute an infringing derivative work under
section 106(2), the work in question "must incorporate a portion of
the copyrighted work in some form," but the Report specifically notes
that, "the preparation of a derivative work, such as a ballet,
pantomime, or improvised performance, may be an infringement even
though nothing is ever fixed in tangible form."181
The Ninth Circuit also compared the function and use of the
Game Genie to that of a kaleidoscope, concluding that viewing a
copyrighted work through a kaleidoscope would not result in the
creation of a derivative work, and that the same conclusion should
therefore apply to the Game Genie.182 However, this part of the
court's analysis is also flawed. The use of a kaleidoscope is more like
the use of the Betamax copier in Sony than it is like the use of the
Game Genie. In Sony, the Supreme Court held that the sale of the
Betamax copier did not give rise to liability for contributory
infringement, because although the copier could be used to infringe, it
could also be used to provide substantial non-infringing uses. 8I Thus,
the Court deemed the copier to be a general purpose device that
could be infringing, or not, depending on how it was used. Therefore,
the mere distribution, sale, and use of the copier could not in and of
itself be contributory infringement.84
Similarly, a kaleidoscope has "substantial non-infringing uses,"'
and thus is not really analogous to the Game Genie. A kaleidoscope
can be used to view its own patterns, or to view any other object or
scene through the patterns that it can be made to produce. In
contrast, the Game Genie had no such "general purpose use;"'16 the
only use of the device was to plug into the Nintendo video system and
allow a player to alter the performance of the Nintendo cartridge, and
had no other use. Similarly, the only function of the filtering software
is to alter the performance of a specific copyrighted motion picture.
Galoob may also be wrong for another reason. Many authorities
suggest that temporary fixation in RAM (Random Access Memory-
a computer's short term memory) is a sufficient fixation in tangible
180. Id. (emphasis added).
181. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 62 (1976) (emphasis added).
182. Galoob, 964 F.2d at 969.
183. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,456 (1984).
184. Id.
185. See supra Part II. D.
186. Galoob, 964 F.2d at 967, 969.
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form to constitute a copy or derivative work.1" Because the
audiovisual performance depicted on a computer screen is fixed in
RAM, arguably the altered screen display in Galoob was in fact fixed,
a point that was completely ignored, and apparently not even raised
by the plaintiff. This same observation applies to digital filtering; the
altered performance that results from filtering is at least temporarily
fixed in the RAM of the home user's computer or DVD player. Thus,
even if fixation were a prerequisite to finding that an infringing
derivative work has been created, the use of the Game Genie, and
likewise the use of digital filtering software, would still constitute
infringement.
In contrast to Galoob, in MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc.,
the Ninth Circuit held that even temporary storage of a work in RAM
was a fixation, because it was "sufficiently permanent or stable to
permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for
a period of more than transitory duration,"' 8 as required by the
Copyright Act definition of "fixed." 189 The court concluded that
fixation in RAM constitutes copying whenever copyrighted operating
system software is loaded into RAM (at the time a computer is turned
on), as is the case when any copyrighted software is loaded into a
computer from permanent storage devices such as "hard disk, floppy
disk, or read only memory [ROM]." 19°
187. See, e.g., MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 519 n.6 (9th Cir.
1993); Vault v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 260 (5th Cir. 1988) ("the act of loading
a program from a medium of storage into a computer's memory creates a copy of the
program").
18& Id. at 518.
189. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2002).
190. MAI Sys. Corp., 991 F.2d at 517-19. Peak Computer provided maintenance and
repair services for their customers who owned MAI computers and operating system
software, or other computer brands running the MAI operating system. Id. at 513. In order
to diagnose their customers' computer problems, Peak's technicians loaded unlicensed
MAI software into their customers' computers, as well as their own. Id In concluding that
"loading software into RAM creates a copy under the Copyright Act," the court relied on
the language of the National Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted
Works ("CONTU") Final Report. MAI Sys. Corp., 991 F.2d at 519 n.6 (citing Final Report
of the National Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works, Chapter 3,
Computers and Copyright (1980), available at http://digital-law-online.info/CONTU/
contul.html [hereinafter CONTU report]); H.R. REP. No. 96-1307(I) at 23 (1980).
Congress established CONTU in 1974 to consider the issue of copyright protection for
computer programs and to make recommendations. MAI Sys. Corp., 991 F.2d at 519 n.6.
CONTU recommended that: "Because the placement of a work into a computer is the
preparation of a copy, the law should provide program into RAM for the purpose of
running, maintaining, or repairing that persons in rightful possession of copies of programs
be able to use them freely without fear of exposure to copyright liability." Id. (citing
CONTU report). Following this recommendation, Congress in 1980 amended section 117
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Thus, the reasoning in the Galoob case is flawed in several
respects, which undermines the persuasiveness of its holding that the
altered performance of the computer game was not a derivative work.
In a case presenting facts similar to Galoob, the Seventh Circuit
reached a strikingly different conclusion. In Midway Mfg. Co. v. Artic
Int'l, Inc.,191 the court concluded that the defendant video arcade
operators, who were licensees of the video game machines of Midway
Manufacturing, were direct, infringers of Midway's audiovisual
copyrights.'9 Specifically, the operators created a derivative work by
replacing the Midway circuit board with a circuit board created and
distributed by Artic, which created a speeded-up version of Midway's
"Galaxian" game.' 93
Artic's electronic circuit boards speeded-up the rate of play of
the arcade video game machines sold by Midway by making the alien
enemies move faster, attack in larger numbers, and drop more bombs
at a time.' 94 The Seventh Circuit held that this altered audiovisual
display was itself an infringing derivative work, because "a speeded-
up video game is a substantially different product from the original
game."' 9' The effect of using Artic's circuit boards was to speed up the
overall experience of the game, giving the consumer a more
challenging and exciting game. Although the defendant argued that
the speeded-up game was like a speeded-up phonograph record, and
therefore not a copyright infringement, the court rejected this
analogy, observing that there was no demand for a speeded-up
record, but there was demand for the speeded-up game because it was
more challenging and exciting, and this demand was capable of
producing additional revenue. Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit
concluded that the users of Artic's product were direct infringers,
because they created unauthorized derivative works by using Artic's
boards to alter the games' performance. Furthermore, the Seventh
Circuit found Artic to be a contributory infringer, because it
distributed and sold the circuit boards to the video game machine
licensees who committed the direct infringement.196
of the Copyright Act to provide that loading an authorized copy of a computer program
should be treated as non-infringing. Pub.L. 96-517, § 10(b), 94 Stat. 3028 (1980).
191. 704 F.2d 1009 (7th Cir. 1983).
192. Id. at 1013.
193. Id.
194. Midway Mfg. Co. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 999, 1004 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
195. Midway Mfg. Co. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 704 F.2d 1009, 1013 (7th Cir. 1983).
196. Id.
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In Midway, the Seventh Circuit did not address the argument
that there was no derivative work because the original version was
not physically incorporated in the altered version.1" The parties
apparently did not raise the issue. On the face of it, there is perhaps a
better argument for finding physical incorporation in Midway than in
Galoob. The infringing circuit board in Midway was inserted in place
of one of the video game machine's original circuit boards;'9 thus,
there was some type of physical incorporation. However, this
argument is relevant only if physical incorporation is essential to a
finding of direct infringement. The court in Midway did not
acknowledge or discuss physical incorporation, because the court
concluded that the audiovisual display-that is, the screen images and
sounds-were the protected work, not the circuit boards.199 Thus, the
physical incorporation of the circuit boards was not relevant to its
analysis.
Interestingly, the district court opinion in Midway anticipated the
"non-infringing uses" issue ten years prior to the "kaleidoscope"
analogy in Galoob and two years prior to the Supreme Court's
"substantial non-infringing uses" analysis in Sony. Artic's speed-up
kits were designed solely to modify the images of the Galaxian game.
Pointing the way to the decision in Sony, the Midway district court
described the uses of the speed-up kit by noting that, "[i]n no way can
it be described as a technological breakthrough benefiting the entire
electronic games industry. '"" Also, Artic's earliest advertising of the
speed-up kits did not mention any other use for the kits other than
specifically to speed up Midway's Galaxian games. 2°' Although there
were two other video games on which the speed-up kit could in fact
be used, it had the effect of radically altering them, causing the words
"WE ARE THE GALAXIANS" to appear the screen, and adding
Galaxian game features to games that otherwise had no such
features.22 On these facts, the district court in Midway had concluded
that the sped-up "Galaxian" game, created by a video game arcade
197. Id. at 1014 (rejecting other arguments raised on appeal "for the reasons set forth
in [the] exhaustive opinion [below].").
198. Id.
199. Id. at 1013-1014. Indeed, the district court opinion below had concluded that
"[t]he work, for which copyright protection was granted, is the audiovisual display
reflecting the author's creativity," and that "Midway has sought and obtained protection
for the audiovisual aspects of its games that appear on the screen." Midway Mfg. Co., 547
F. Supp. at 1007-1009.
200. Id. at 1014.
201. Midway Mfg. Co., 547 F. Supp. at 1007-09.
202 Id. at 1005.
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operator using Artic's circuit board, was an infringing derivative work
of Midway's Galaxian video game.2 3
Faced with the analogous issue ,in a digital filtering case, how
should a court resolve these conflicting precedents? The decision in
Midway is more persuasive than Galoob. The Galoob decision relies
in large part on the court's unsupported premise that a derivative
work must incorporate a copyrighted work in some "concrete or
permanent form," when in fact, the statutory language simply refers
to incorporation in "any form," and the legislative history specifically
states that an altered performance may be an infringement even
though nothing is ever fixed in a tangible form. In addition, although
not noted in either Galoob or Midway, substantial authority suggests
that transitory fixation in RAM would be a sufficient fixation even if
Congress had intended to impose a fixation requirement only for
copies or derivative works. , This argument provides additional
support for the outcome in Midway.
Therefore, under the logic of Midway and MAI, home users
prepare unauthorized derivative works whenever they use digital
filtering products-whether these involve the use of hardware,
software, or a combination of both in conjunction with custom-made
"E-Rated" filters-to alter the performance of original motion
picture DVDs. Unless the home users' activities qualify as fair use,
they are direct infringers.
(iii) Fair Use by Home Users
In the event that home users create derivative works using digital
filtering products, their use may nonetheless be non-infringing if it is a
fair use. In that case, the digital filtering companies would not be
contributorily liable, because there would be no direct infringement
by the consumer.
The question of whether home users are engaging in fair use
turns on the familiar fair use indicia: (1) the purpose and the
character of the use, including whether it is for commercial or
educational purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work itself;
(3) the amount of the copyrighted work that is used and how
significant a portion of the work that amount represents; (4) how the
use affects the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work,
and (5) other equitable factors.2
203. Id. at 1013-14.
204. See supra Part II. C.
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The purpose and character of the consumers' use of digital
filtering software is probably not commercial, because home users are
buying the original film to view for home viewing, as altered by the
filtering software. Even though the digital filtering companies charge
their customers for the custom-made software filters, as well as the
software filtering application programs (or, in some cases, the
hardware components) that run the filters to control the performance
of the original DVD, the customers' actual use of the product is
private and personal. In this case just as in Sony, the seller of the
device is making money, but the home users are not. As to the second
factor, the creative nature of copyrighted motion pictures places them
at the "core of copyright protection," just like the musical works in
Napster and MP3.com and the televised films in Sony. As to the
amount taken, almost the entire amount and substance of each film is
used to create the altered performance that constitutes the infringing
derivative work. Finally, as to the effect on the market, although
arguably consumers would not have purchased these films if the
editing services were unavailable, MP3.com suggests that this
argument is unavailing, because consumers are usurping the original
author's market for derivative works.
In the somewhat analogous situation presented by the Napster
case, Napster argued that even if Napster users had directly infringed
A&M Records' exclusive rights by copying music files, they were
protected by fair use.2" The Ninth Circuit court did not agree.2 It
found that the purpose and character of the use was commercial,
because "repeated and exploitative unauthorized copies of
copyrighted works were made to save the expense of purchasing
authorized copies," and because file swapping was a form of
commercial exchange.2 The Ninth Circuit observed that musical
works are close to the core of intended copyright protection,21 and
that Napster users engaged in wholesale copying, because the process
of file transfer of MP3 files copies the entire work. Under the fourth
factor, the Ninth Circuit also noted that the copyright owners cannot
be deprived of the right to develop alternative markets for their
works simply because the copyright infringer causes no harm to the
205. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1014 (9th Cir. 2001).
206. Id. at 1014-1015.
207. Id. at 1015.
208. Id. at 1016.
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owners' established markets.29 Therefore, the court concluded that
the file transfer of A&M's musical recordings was not fair use. 1°
In the case of home users of the digital editing technologies, the
purpose and character of the use is not commercial, but is
transformative. The nature of the copyrighted works are highly
creative. Almost the entire film is used, with some alterations for
offensive sights and sounds; thus, a significant amount in quantity and
substance of the film works is used. Finally, moving to the fourth
factor, the ability of home users to create their own derivative
versions of the films usurps a market that belongs to the copyright
owner. The studios may at some point want to create their own E-
rated versions of their motion pictures. At that time they may find
that, as in Acuff-Rose and Midway, the marketplace is saturated with
unauthorized versions of their product. In addition, any suggestion
that the editing companies actually increase sales of motion pictures
to an audience who might otherwise not purchase the films will be an
unavailing, as suggested by MP3.com and Napster.
On balance, then, digital filtering companies-like their digital
editing counterparts-will be unable to rely on fair use to avoid
liability for copyright infringement. As in Napster, the movie editing
companies will be unable to rely on lack of harm to the Studios'
current markets as justification to encroach on other markets
potentially available to the Studios. Thus, arguments that their
filtering products actually increase sales of original unedited copies of
the films are unlikely to support fair use.
(iv) Substantial Non-infringing Uses
Even if digital filtering software contributes to direct
infringements by home users the producers of the software may still
avoid contributory liability if the software is capable of substantial
non-infringing uses.211 This analysis is illustrated by the Sony Betamax
case and the Grokster file exchange case, a more recent case with
facts very similar to those of Napster.21 2 In Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer
Studios v. Grokster, the Ninth Circuit distinguished the facts of the
case from those in Napster, holding that defendants Grokster and
209. Id. at 1017. The court also agreed with the district court's findings that Napster's
copying had reduced CD sales to college students and had raised barriers to A&M's entry
into the digital music downloading market. Id. at 1016.
210. Id.
211. See supra Part II. D.
212. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir.
2004), cert. granted 125 S. Ct. 686 (2004).
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StreamCast were not contributorily liable.213 Like Napster, Grokster
and StreamCast distributed peer-to-peer digital file sharing software,
Grokster and Morpheus, respectively, from their websites to enable
users to share digital media over the Internet.214 However, unlike
Napster's services, the actual exchange of digital media files did not in
any way utilize services provided by Grokster's servers. Rather, the
file indexing and exchange processes were accomplished entirely by
peer-to-peer networking connections through the end-users' personal
computers.215
The Ninth Circuit in Grokster determined that some end-users
were directly infringing the plaintiffs' copyrights by sharing digital
music and movie files.216 However, it held that Grokster and
StreamCast were not contributorily liable, because the file exchange
software, Grokster and Morpheus, had substantial non-infringing
uses: 21 As the district court observed,"[I]t is undisputed that there are
substantial non-infringing uses for Defendants' software-e.g.,
distributing movie trailers, free songs or other non-copyrighted
works; using the software in countries where it is legal; or sharing the
works of Shakespeare.
2 18
In the case of digital filters, however, each filter is custom
tailored to each motion picture. The filter has no possible uses other
than to map out one particular motion picture and filter objectionable
content from it. Therefore, unlike the Betamax videotape recorder, or
the Grokster digital file sharing software, digital movie filtering
products are not capable of substantial non-infringing uses.
Accordingly, if the home users who use custom-made editing filters
are direct copyright infringers, then the digital filtering companies
themselves are contributory copyright infringers.
c. Intermediate Copying, Reverse Engineering, and Fair Use
In the case of digital filtering companies, the creation of the
filtering software constitutes a prima facie case of direct infringement,
because the creators of filtering software copy motion pictures as an
initial step in creating that software. In response to claims that direct
infringement occurs during this initial copying step, digital filtering
213. Grokster, 380 F.3d at 1157.
214. Id. at 1158.
215. Id. at 1159-60.
216. Id. at 1160.
217. Id. at 1161-62.
218. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1035
(C.D. Cal. 2003).
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companies may raise a fair use defense premised on the argument
that their intermediate copying constitutes legitimate reverse
engineering.
"Reverse engineering," in the copyright context, is the process
used to isolate the components of a complete computer integrated
circuit chip or software system. In the case of a chip, reverse
engineering identifies all the individual component circuits that make
up the chip. Similarly, software programs or applications can be
reverse engineered to yield the individual software coding
statements.219 In Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc.,° the Ninth
Circuit held that intermediate copying of computer object code may
infringe the copyright owner's exclusive rights, whether or not the
end product also infringes. 22' However, the court concluded that
"where disassembly is the only way to gain access to the ideas and
functional elements embodied in a copyrighted computer program
and where there is a legitimate reason for seeking such access,
disassembly is a fair use of the copyrighted work, as a matter of
law." Accordingly, Sega held that an intermediate copy is non-
infringing if it is a necessary step in the process of determining the
ideas and functional concepts embedded in the software code,
because these elements are not protected by copyright.2
The case of the filtering companies is distinguishable from Sega,
however, because their final product is a filtering device specially
designed to produce an infringing altered performance of the original
motion picture. Any reverse engineering process used by the digital
filtering companies to facilitate the creation of their filters-perhaps
by revealing the closed-caption timing information, or other digital
frame-identifying information embedded in the DVD-would reveal
such timing code information for the purpose of copying, altering, and
distributing the creative aspects of the Studios' motion pictures.
Identifying individual frames of a motion picture on DVD using
digital frame-identifying information encoded in the DVD is
analogous to identifying individual frames of the motion picture on
35mm film using the human eye to detect the beginning and ending of
each frame on film. In both cases, identifying particular frames allows
the copier to distinguish one frame from another. The digital filtering
219. Id.
220. Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992).
221. Id. at 1519.
222 Id. at 1527-28.
223. See supra Part II. E.
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companies reveal the functional concepts-the timing code-in order
to alter the creative aspects of the film at a precise point denoted by
the timing code, and thereby create an unauthorized derivative work.
Thus, any intermediate copy made by the digital filtering companies
would be an infringing copy, and not part of a permissible reverse
engineering process protected by fair use.
B. Trademark Issues
1. Federal Unfair Competition under the Lanham Act-Section 43(a)
Because third-party digital editing services and filtering
technologies provide altered versions of motion pictures to home
viewers,22 it may be argued that the consumer will be led to believe-
erroneously-that the altered film originates from, or has in some
manner been approved by, the motion picture director or studio that
created the original film, or by the producer, actors, or other creative
participants. This constitutes a false designation of origin for several
reasons. First, consumers purchasing edited versions of VHS tapes
and DVDs-or viewing filtered versions of those works-cannot
distinguish those aspects of the resulting film that originated from the
producer, director, or studio, from those aspects that were altered by
the third-party editors. Second, in the case of the filtering products as
well as editing services, the opening and closing credits identifying the
producers, directors, and studios are retained in the altered versions,
thereby suggesting that the entire film, including the portions altered
by the third-party editors, originated with the producers, directors,
and studios. And finally, in the case of digital editing services, the
digital editing companies return the altered VHS and DVD versions
of the motion pictures in the original packaging, 225 or along with the
original packaging,22 further suggesting the sponsorship, approval, or
affiliation of the original filmmakers. Any of these activities may
constitute a false designation of origin under section 43(a) of the
Lanham Act. 27
Although perhaps not as radical as the alterations encountered in
Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Cos., Inc.,22 where the plaintiffs'
film was shortened and interspliced with commercials, or King v.
224. See supra Part I.
225. Merrill, supra note 48 and accompanying text.
226. Id.
227. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2002).
228. 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976).
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Innovation Books,29 where a writer was falsely represented as having
exercised creative control over a film that had been loosely adapted
from his short story without any input from him, the alterations made
by the third-party editing companies are nonetheless substantial. Any
content deemed to be offensive because of nudity, sexual situations,
offensive language, or graphic violence is removed from each motion
picture. In addition to altering the creators' artistic vision, the editing
may be of poor quality. Such altered films are mutilated versions of
the original, and the names of the producers, directors, and studios
remain attached to the films through the original packaging and
screen credits of the film, as well as by reputation, publicity, and
marketing.
A likelihood of confusion between the altered versions and the
original motion pictures exists, because, as in Gilliam, purchasers will
not have the originals for side by side comparison-precisely because
they do not want to see the original motion picture. It is true that
original purchasers may know that "offensive" content has been
edited out in altered versions, but they will not necessarily know
precisely what content has been removed or altered. Furthermore,
viewers other than the original purchasers of the altered versions
might see the altered versions and not even realize that the versions
are not the original motion picture. As in Gilliam, home viewers will
see the altered product bearing the original source indicators, and
could be led to believe that the altered version is the work of the
studios and directors rather than the third-party editing companies.
In the case of digital filtering technologies, the third-party
companies do not actually distribute altered versions of the original
DVDs to consumers. Rather, consumers use the filtering technologies
to create altered versions of motion picture performances.23
However, the same question arises in this situation as in the case of
digital editing described above-whether the home user believes that
the altered performance originates from, or is approved by the
director or studio. First, home users cannot tell what aspects of the
altered version of the performance are attributable to the producers,
directors and studios, and what aspects are altered by the filtering
products. Second, the original credits identifying the producers,
directors, and studios as the originators of the film remain intact.
Finally, when digital filtering products are used, the original DVD
packaging remains unaltered, which can reinforce the home users'
229. 976 F.2d 824 (2d Cir. 1992).
230. See supra Part IV. B.
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impression that the altered work originates from, or is endorsed by,
the producers, directors, studios, and other creative participants
named on the package.
Regarding the substantiality of the alterations, digital filtering
products are designed to edit the very same content that the digital
editing services edit-content deemed to be offensive due to
offensive language, nudity, sexual situations, or graphic violence.
Furthermore, both digital editing services and filtering products are
designed to provide the same result-altered versions of original
motion pictures. Clean Cut, CleanFlicks, Edit My Movies/Edited
Moves, Family Flix, and Video II provide unauthorized altered
versions of motion pictures on VHS and DVD. ClearPlay and Family
Shield Technologies provide unauthorized altered versions of motion
picture performances. As in the case of digital editing, the filtering
effects not only alter the artistic vision of the creators, but may also
be of poor quality. Thus, the alterations of original motion picture
performances resulting from filtering technology products are just as
substantial as the alterations of original motion picture DVDs
resulting from digital editing services. 3'
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Dastar Corporation v.
Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation3 2 has complicated the
section 43(a) analysis. In Dastar, the Court held that "origin of
goods" in section 43(a)(1)(A) "refers to the producer of the tangible
goods that are offered for sale, and not to the author of any idea,
concept, or communication embodied in those goods., 233 The work at
issue in Dastar was a television series originally distributed on beta
cam tapes that had passed into the public domain because Fox had
not renewed its copyright in the television rights.2 Dastar had bought
a set of the original tapes, made copies, and edited the original series,
now in the public domain, to create its own series.235 The Court held
that Dastar had not violated section 43(a) of the Lanham Act,
because it was the originator of the newly edited series that it had
accurately represented as its own.236
231. Id.
232. 539 U.S. 23 (2003).
233. Id. at 37.
234. Id. at 26.
235. Id. at 26-27. Dastar had edited the original content by removing approximately
half of the original, including all references to General Eisenhower's book, "Crusades in
Europe," on which the original series had been based, and by adding new material,
including, among other things, new credits, and new opening, closing and chapter-title
sequences.
236. Id. at 38.
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The scope of the Supreme Court's holding in Dastar is unclear. If
limited to the facts of that case,237 it would apply only to works in the
public domain. In that event, the holdings in Gilliam and Innovation
Books would continue to apply in cases where works are protected by
copyright, but not to works in the public domain. However, although
the work at issue in Dastar was in the public domain, the broad
language of the holding can be read to apply to all works of
authorship, those protected by copyright as well as those in the public
domain.]3 Thus, construing the Dastar holding broadly, the only party
that could be recognized as the "origin" of a particular copy of a
copyrighted (or public domain) work would be the party that created
that physical copy. Therefore, a digital editing company might be
liable to the Studio that created a film when the editing company
distributes an altered copy of the work under the Studio's name,
because the Studio did not create or authorize that particular copy.
The case for a section 43(a) claim against digital filtering companies
might be more difficult, however, since the plaintiffs would have to
establish that home users would be likely to attribute the filtering
effects of the software to the original creators of the film, even though
the software and the film are in different packages. The directors or
other creative participants named in the film credits might also be
able to raise claims under section 43(a), since they, too, played no
role in the making of the unauthorized edited copy. In contrast, if
Dastar's narrow definition of the "origin" of goods applies only to
copies of public domain works, then the editing service that
distributes an altered version of a copyrighted film might not be
violating section 43(a) by attributing the altered film to its original
creators, even though that attribution is false and misleading. This
interpretation, however, seems inconsistent with the consumer
protection goals of section 43(a).
Dastar might also be inapplicable to digital editing and filtering
for another reason. Dastar involved a claim of reverse passing off
(putting the defendant's brand name on the plaintiff's product),
rather than traditional passing off (putting the plaintiff's brand name
on the defendant's product). It is therefore not entirely clear whether
the Supreme Court intended its narrow construction of "goods"
under section 43(a) to apply equally to traditional passing off claims,
such as those at issue in Gilliam, Innovations, and the digital editing
237. See id. at 25-27, 31, 34-38.
23& See id. at 38.
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and filtering cases. If Dastar is limited to cases of reverse passing off,
then it will have no effect on the digital editing and filtering cases.
Thus, the Supreme Court's ruling in Dastar has complicated the
section 43(a) analysis of digital editing and filtering services, yet it is
not entirely clear whether Dastar even applies to these traditional
passing-off claims, or whether the films in question are exempt from
the Dastar analysis because they are copyrighted rather than in the
public domain.
Even if Dastar does limit the availability of a section 43(a) claim
in the case of digital editing and filtering, the plaintiffs might still have
recourse under the state law counterparts of section 43(a). The
content of these statutes is typically similar to that of section 43(a),
but courts interpreting these statutes are not bound to interpret them
the same way that Dastar interpreted section 43(a). No doubt,
however, many of them will do exactly that. 39
2. Federal Trademark Dilution under the Lanham Act-Section 43(c)
The studios, directors, producers, and possibly even some of the
actors and other creative participants in a film may also have a
dilution claim against editing and filtering companies. Dilution exists
whenever the capacity of a famous mark to identify and distinguish
goods or services is lessened, regardless of whether or not there is
competition between the owner of the mark and anyone else, or
likelihood of confusion, mistake, or deceptionfm
The owner of a famous trademark is entitled to enjoin the
commercial use of that mark by another if the use occurs after the
mark is already famous and results in the dilution of the famous
mark:241
In determining whether a mark is distinctive and famous, a court
may consider factors such as, but not limited to -
the degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the mark;
the duration and extent of use of the mark in connection with
the goods or services with which the mark is used;
the duration and extent of advertising and publicity of the
mark;
the geographical extent of the trading area in which the mark
is used;
239. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Dastar Corp., 2003 WL 22669587 (C.D. Cal.
2003).
240. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2002).
241. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2002).
20051 ON A CLEARPLAY, YOU CAN SEE WHATEVER
the channels of trade for the goods or services with which the
mark is used;
the degree of recognition of the mark in the trading areas and
channels of trade used by the mark's owner and the person
against whom the injunction is sought;
the nature and extent of use of the same or similar marks by
third parties; and
whether the mark was registered under the Act of March 3,
1881, or the Act of February 20, 1905, or on the principal
register.242
The names of the studios are arguably famous marks. The names
of many of the directors are arguably famous marks as well, e.g.,
Martin Scorsese, Steven Spielberg, Robert Redford, and Sydney
Pollack. The same could be true of some producers, actors, or other
creative participants such as cinematographers. The third-party
editing companies create and distribute-or facilitate the creation
of-unauthorized altered versions of motion pictures bearing these
famous marks. By altering motion pictures created, developed, and
distributed by the studios, digital editing and filtering technologies
arguably diminish the capacity of the studios' famous marks to
uniquely distinguish and identify their motion pictures. By altering
the famous directors' original vision and artistic choices, it is likely
that third-party digital editing services and filtering products limit the
ability of their famous marks-their names-to distinguish and
identify their unique directorial styles and artistry.
Unfortunately, the uncertain scope of the Dastar holding could
have an impact on the section 43(c) analysis as well, since section
43(c) applies only to the unauthorized use of another's trademark on
"goods or services" which that party did not produce. In addition, the
studios' and directors' prospects for success under section 43(c) will
be impaired by the Supreme Court's holding in Moseley that a federal
dilution claim requires proof of actual dilution rather than mere
likelihood of dilution.243
3. Trademark Dilution under State Law
The FTDA amendment to the Lanham Act did not pre-empt
state dilution statutes.244 For the states with dilution statutes similar to
242. Id.
243. Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418,432 (2003).
244. Id. at 4 ("It is important to note that H.R. 1295 would not pre-empt existing state
dilution statutes. State laws could continue to be applied in cases involving locally famous
or distinctive marks. Unlike patent and copyright laws, federal trademark law presently
coexists with state trademark law, and it is to be expected that a federal dilution statute
[27:567HASTINGS COMM]ENT L.J.
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the federal dilution statute, the analysis would be similar to that
which applies to section 43(c); however, a dilution claim might still
fare better under state law because the courts would not be bound to
apply Dastar or Moseley analysis to these statutes. In those states
where a mark need not be famous in order to receive protection from
dilution, however, the case for dilution by editing and filtering
services is even stronger. In those states, dilution may be found where
the mark is merely distinctive; it need not be famous.2 45 And because
the state statutes apply locally, even in those states which require a
mark to be famous, if a court determined that the marks in question
are not nationally famous, they might nonetheless be found to be
locally famous, depending on the state. Furthermore, where states
impose a requirement that the mark be famous, the standard for
measuring fame may be easier to satisfy under state law than under
federal law. Finally, those states which have dilution statutes not
modeled after the FTDA, 46 and even some that follow the FTDA
model, will not necessarily follow the Supreme Court's decision in
Moseley, which held that a dilution claim under the FTDA requires a
showing that dilution has already occurred. In states that do not
follow Moseley, a mere likelihood of dilution may be sufficient
grounds for relief.
C. Family Movie Act (FMA) 2005
The Family Movie Act, which is currently being considered by
Congress, would create a broad privilege permitting the use of
filtering technology to produce altered versions of copyrighted films
without the consent of the copyright holders. Although the FMA
would not allow fixation or distribution of the censored films,247 it
would allow companies to produce and distribute filtering software
that would enable the consumer to create unfixed derivative works.
24
The Act would also appear to allow intermediate copying of the
movie by the filtering companies to the extent such copying is
necessary to create the filtering software for each film.249
should similarly coexist with state dilution law.").
245. Ga. Code AnL, § 10-1-451(b) (2004); see, e.g., Original Appalachian Artworks,
Inc. v. Tops Chewing Gum, Inc. 642 F. Supp. 1031 (N.D. Ga. 1986).
246. See, e.g., New Sensor Corp. v. CE Distribution LLC, 2004 WL 231237 (E.D.N.Y.
2004); Brennan's, Inc. v. Brennan's Restaurant, LLC., 2003 WL 1338681 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
247. See Family Movie Act of 2005, S. 167, 109th Cong., 1st Sess. (2004) available at
http://thomas.loc.gov (last visited Feb. 26, 2005) (on file with author).
248. Id.
249. Id. The wording of the statute is ambiguous as to whether fixation is permitted,
but intermediate fixation appears to be essential to the creation of the filtering software.
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The Family Movie Act of 2005 provides that the following
language would be added to current copyright law:
(a) In General- Section 110 of title 17, United States Code, is
amended--
(1) in paragraph (9), by striking 'and' after the semicolon at the
end;
(2) in paragraph (10), by striking the period at the end and
inserting '; and';
(3) by inserting after paragraph (10) the following:
'(11) the making imperceptible, by or at the direction of a
member of a private household, of limited portions of audio or
video content of a motion picture, during a performance in or
transmitted to that household for private home viewing, from
an authorized copy of the motion picture, or the creation or
provision of a computer program or other technology that
enables such making imperceptible and that is designed and
marketed to be used, at the direction of a member of a private
household, for such making imperceptible, if no fixed copy of
the altered version of the motion picture is created by such
computer program or other technology.'; and
(4) by adding at the end the following:
'For purposes of paragraph (11), the term 'making
imperceptible' does not include the addition of audio or video
content that is performed or displayed over or in place of
existing content in a motion picture.
'Nothing in paragraph (11) shall be construed to imply further
rights under section 106 of this title, or to have any effect on
defenses or limitations on rights granted under any other
section of this title or under any other paragraph of this
section.'.
(b) Exemption From Trademark Infringement- Section 32 of the
Trademark Act of 1946 (15 U.S.C. 1114) is amended by adding at
the end the following:
'(3)(A) Any person who engages in the conduct described in
paragraph (11) of section 110 of title 17, United States Code,
and who complies with the requirements set forth in that
paragraph is not liable on account of such conduct for a
violation of any right under this Act. This subparagraph does
not preclude liability, nor shall it be construed to restrict the
defenses or limitations on rights granted under this Act, of a
person for conduct not described in paragraph (11) of section
110 of title 17, United States Code, even if that person also
engages in conduct described in paragraph (11) of section 110
of such title.
'(B) A manufacturer, licensee, or licensor of technology that
enables the making of limited portions of audio or video
content of a motion picture imperceptible as described in
subparagraph (A) is not liable on account of such manufacture
or license for a violation of any right under this Act, if such
manufacturer, licensee, or licensor ensures that the technology
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provides a clear and conspicuous notice at the beginning of
each performance that the performance of the motion picture
is altered from the performance intended by the director or
copyright holder of the motion picture. The limitations on
liability in subparagraph (A) and this subparagraph shall not
apply to a manufacturer, licensee, or licensor of technology
that fails to comply with this paragraph.
'(C) The requirement under subparagraph (B) to provide
notice shall apply only with respect to technology
manufactured after the end of the 180-day period beginning on
the date of the enactment of the Family Movie Act of 2005.
'(D) Any failure by a manufacturer, licensee, or licensor of
technology to qualify for the exemption under subparagraphs
(A) and (B) shall not be construed to create an inference that
any such party that engages in conduct described in paragraph
(11) of section 110 of title 17, United States Code, is liable for
trademark infringement by reason of such conduct.'.
(c) Definition-In this section, the term 'Trademark Act of 1946'
means the Act entitled 'An Act to provide for the registration and
protection of trademarks used in commerce, to carry out the
provisions of certain international conventions, and for other
purposes', approved July 5, 1946 (15 U.S.C. 1051 et seq.).
250
The proponents of the bill believe that parents should be able to
shield their children from objectionable material 51 Rep. Lamar Smith
(R-Texas) told a House Judiciary subcommittee hearing that the
purpose of the proposed legislation is "to protect the right of parents
to shield their children from violence, sex, and profanity," adding that
"[t]he issue isn't whether a movie loses some of its authenticity due to
skipping of various audio and video, but whether parents have the
right to shield their children from offensive content.''252 Rep. Zoe
Lofgren (D-Calif.) argued that because the filters do no more than
skip and mute the DVD player in ways that the consumer would do,
there is no infringement. 3 However, consumers who are using
filtering software do not do the muting and skipping themselves. The
filtering companies are actually doing the muting and skipping, and
250. Family Movie Act of 2005, S. 167, 109th Cong. (2004) available at
http://thomas.loc.gov (last visited Feb. 26, 2005) (on file with author).
251. Anandashankar Mazumdar, House Judiciary Committee Reports "Family Movie
Act to F7oor," PAT., TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. Vol. 68, No. 1680 at 350 (July 23,
2004).
252. MontereyHerald.Com, Business, Technology, Lawmaker vows to protect tech that
lets parents filter DVDs, May 20, 2004, available at http://www.montereyherald.com/
mld/montereyherald/business/technology/8716053.htm (last visited Aug. 29, 2004) (on file
with author).
253. Anandashankar Mazumdar, IP Subcommittee Forwards Family Movie Bill to Full
House Judiciary Committee, PAT., TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J., Vol. 68, No. 1679 at
308 (July 16, 2004).
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they, rather than the consumers, determine what the viewing
experience will be. Even when the filtering company offers a range of
editing choices for a particular film, the consumer's involvement is
limited to selecting among the versions chosen for them by the
filtering company.
The original bill, passed in 2004 by the House, differed
significantly from S. 167. The House bill was broader than the Senate
bill, permitting "the making of limited portions of audio or video
content of a motion picture imperceptible by or for the owner ...
This language allowed for more than just skips and mutes to make
portions of the content "imperceptible." It conceivably could have
allowed for superimposed images or sounds to block the offensive
portions.
However, S. 167 narrows the scope of the original bill, by
defining the term "making imperceptible" to exclude "the addition of
audio or video content that is performed or displayed over or in place
of existing content in a motion picture." 5 This is a significant
narrowing of the legislation.
Rep. Maxine Waters (D-Calif.) characterized the original bill as a
"step towards government censorship." She suggested that a less
drastic means to help parents shield objectionable material from
children is to let the copyright holders prepare the versions
themselves, the same way they do for television broadcasts and airline
versions.2v These comments seem equally applicable to S. 167. Rep.
Howard L. Berman (D-Calif.) had argued that the original bill would
not offer consumer protection or bolster parental rights, but would
relieve one particular technology from paying royalties to copyright
owners.2' This is equally true of S. 167. Rep. Berman had also warned
that the original bill would allow individuals to make any changes
they wished, not just those that are considered harmful to children. 1 9
Although S. 167 narrows the scope of permissible changes, Rep.
Berman's criticism is still valid.
The proposed legislation is bad policy. The exclusive right to
create a derivative work is a longstanding and fundamental right of
254. Family Movie Act of 2004, H.R. 4586, 108th Cong. (2004), available at
http://thomas.loc.gov (last visited Aug. 29, 2004) (on file with author).
255. Family Movie Act of 2005, S. 167, 109th Cong. (2004) available at
http://thomas.loc.gov (last visited Feb. 26,2005) (on file with author).
256. Mazumdar, supra note 253, at 308.
257. Id.
258. Mazumdar, supra note 251, at 350.
259. Mazumdar, supra note 253, at 308.
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the copyright owner.26° The proponents of the use of filters have not
demonstrated that such filters are necessary. Unlike internet
pornography or offensive television programming, both of which can
enter consumers' homes easily unless the consumer is able to
implement controls, an objectionable DVD will not normally be in
someone's home unless they have made an affirmative effort to
obtain a copy. Parents need not buy or rent DVDs that they find
objectionable; they can thereby ensure that their children do not
watch them.
The FMA, if enacted, could also cause the United States to be in
violation of at least three international treaties to which it is a
signatory. Article 12 of the Berne Convention provides that
"[a]uthors of literary or artistic works shall enjoy the exclusive right
of authorizing adaptations, arrangements and other alterations of
their works."' Article 2(1) and Article 14bis of Berne make clear
that this right applies to motion pictures.262 The WIPO Copyright
Treaty incorporates Berne, as does the agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Including Trade in
Counterfeit Goods (TRIPS), which is part of the World Trade
Organization (WTO) Agreement, also known as the Uruguay Round
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). 264 The
WTO has the power to impose trade sanctions on the United States if
it does not comply with the terms of the agreement.2 It would be
especially unwise to enact the FMA if its protections are not really
necessary and would violate international law.
Conclusion
Responding to consumer demand for "E-Rated" versions of
major Hollywood films, the small but growing third-party editing and
filtering industry has engaged in, and/or facilitated, unauthorized
260. The exclusive right to create derivative works was added to federal copyright law
in 1870. Copyright Act of 1870. 16 Stat. 198 (1870).
261. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, July 24,
1971, 1986 Lexis 160 (June 20, 1986), art. 12.
262. Id. at arts. 2(1) & l4bis.
263. WIPO Copyright Treaty, April 12, 1997, art. 1(4), S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-17, 36
IL.M. 65.
264. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Including
Trade in Counterfeit Goods (TRIPS), Art. 9, ann. 1A, 33 I.L.M. 1154 (1994).
265. See Mary LaFrance, Congress TRIPS over International Law: WTO Finds
Unfairness in Music Licensing Act, 11 DEPAUL - LCA J. ART & ENT. L. 397 (2002)
(discussing imposition of sanctions against United States for failing to adequately protect
public performance rights in copyrighted music).
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copying, preparation of derivative works, and distribution of the
studios' copyrighted motion pictures, thereby infringing on the
exclusive rights of the studios under the Copyright Act of 1976.266
Moreover, the conduct of the companies and the digital editing
and filtering technologies that they use to create altered versions of
the studios motion pictures may also involve a false designation of
origin and/or dilution of the distinctive quality of the famous marks of
the studios and directors in violation of sections 43(a) and 43(c) under
the Lanham Act,267 and comparable state laws.
The resolution of the issues raised by digital editing and digital
filtering is important, because the rights of creators and copyright
owners to prevent unauthorized and substantial alterations of their
works have generally been understood to warrant protection under
copyright law and, in many cases, unfair competition law. If the
radical changes created by the purveyors of unauthorized "E-Rated"
adaptations of copyrighted works are permitted under a "fair use"
rationale or narrowed interpretations of the Lanham Act, the same
logic may lead to permitting other significant alterations of
copyrighted works, and the exclusive right to create derivative works
under section 106(2) of the Copyright Act, as well as the right to
prevent false attribution of unauthorized adaptations, will offer little,
if any, protection to the creators and owners of expressive works.
Companies can seek permission to license "E-Rated" edited
versions of the movies on DVD, just as TV broadcasters and airlines
do now. TV broadcasters obtain permission to edit content for
broadcast. Nothing is sacred: even "Sex and the City," originally
broadcast on HBO,268 is edited for content in its current reincarnation
on TBS.2 9 There is no reason why the filtering companies should not
follow the same process-seek permission to edit for content.270 As
Jack Valenti of the Motion Picture Association of America argued at
266. 17 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. (2002).
267. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1125 & 1127 (2002).
268. Home Box Office
269. Turner Broadcasting System. Rebecca Quick, 'Sex and the City' going
mainstream, MSNBC Home, CNBC TV, http://msnbc.msn.com/id/4354469/ (last visited on
Sept. 1, 2004) (on file with author).
270. See Anandashankar Mazumdar, Peters Says Legislation Not Needed To Protect
Scene-Skipping Technology, PAT., TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J., Vol. 68, No. 1677, 194,
195 (June 25, 2004). RCA DVD players now ship with ClearPlay programming for 100
DVD movies built-in. Greg Tarr, Twice, Wal-Mart, Kmart to Sell Parent-Friendly DVD
Players, , at http://www.twice.com/article/CA409079.html (last visited Aug. 22, 2004) (on
file with author).
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the June 17 hearing of the House of Representatives Subcommittee
on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property, let the marketplace
determine who receives film versions for performances. 71
271. Mazumdar, supra note 270, at 195.
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